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Kinsella & Marcus (2009; K&M) argue that considerations of biological evo-
lution invalidate the picture of optimal language design put forward under 
the rubric of the minimalist program (Chomsky 1993 et seq.), but in this 
article it will be pointed out that K&M’s objection is undermined by (i) their 
misunderstanding of minimalism as imposing an aprioristic presumption of 
optimality and (ii) their failure to discuss the third factor of language design. 
It is proposed that the essence of K&M’s suggestion be reconstructed as the 
sound warning that one should refrain from any preconceptions about the 
object of inquiry, to which K&M commit themselves based on their biased 
view of evolution. A different reflection will be cast on the current minima-
list literature, arguably along the lines K&M envisaged but never completed, 
converging on a recommendation of methodological (and, in a somewhat 
unconventional sense, metaphysical) naturalism. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A normal human infant can learn any natural language(s) he or she is exposed to, 
whereas none of their pets (kittens, dogs, etc.) can, even given exactly the same 
data from the surrounding speech community. There must be something special, 
then, to the genetic endowment of human beings that is responsible for the emer-
gence of this remarkable linguistic capacity. Human language is thus a biological 
object that somehow managed to come into existence in the evolution of the hu-
man species.  
 In a recent issue of Biolinguistics, Kinsella & Marcus (2009; K&M) argue that 
‘evolvability’ should be a central constraint on linguistic theorizing, both in terms 
of methodology and empirical content. They specifically argue that evolution in 
                                                 
     We are grateful to Naoki Fukui, Terje Lohndal, Bridget Samuels, and Masanobu Ueda for 
their helpful comments on the earlier draft of this article. All remaining inadequacies are 
solely ours.  
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the natural world is known to create all sorts of imperfect and redundant organ-
isms, and thus human language should also be expected to fall in this major cate-
gory of imperfection. They pose their evolutionary argument in opposition to the 
minimalist program for linguistic theory advanced by Chomsky (1993 et seq.), 
which seeks signs of optimality in the computational mechanism of human lang-
uage. K&M’s position is also in opposition to the thesis that the theory of lang-
uage evolution very much depends on the theory of language, for which we can 
find various resonances in the linguistic literature (see, e.g., Chomsky 1980, Jack-
endoff 2010). 
 We totally agree with K&M in that our theory of language must achieve 
evolutionary plausibility or meet the evolvability condition. Unfortunately, how-
ever, their conception of this notion is not a legitimate one, ignoring many as-
pects of biological evolution that are not readily captured by their biased view on 
adaptation. In this paper, we will reject K&M's framing of these issues and argue 
that there should not be any stipulated or presumed asymmetric dependency 
between the theory of language and the theory of evolution. We will critically ex-
amine K&M’s counterarguments to biolinguistic minimalism, and point out that 
(i) they fail to discuss the third factor of language design, which plays a central 
role in biolinguistic minimalism (Chomsky 2005), and that (ii) K&M’s adherence 
to the Neo-Darwinian dogma of gradual adaptation by natural selection is in ex-
act opposition to their otherwise sound warning that we should not be trapped 
by any aprioristic presumptions regarding the nature of the object of inquiry. We 
will also discuss how these considerations relate to methodological naturalism 
originally put forward by Chomsky (1995a, 2000b). 
 
 
2. The Minimalist Program and the Third Factor of Language Design 
 
K&M point to various corners of natural language and suggest that human lang-
uage cannot be regarded as either perfect or optimal. According to K&M’s view, 
not only countless superficial performance errors like slips of the tongue and 
garden-path parsing but also various aspects of the core architecture of gram-
matical competence such as morphological redundancy and irregularity, lexical 
and structural ambiguity, and other apparently unnecessary complexities consti-
tute ample evidence for the imperfection of human language. K&M claim that in-
elegance and inefficiency are traits that we usually expect biological objects to 
have, given the overall tendency for evolution to fall short of ideal architectural 
designs. They adduce these facts against the strong minimalist thesis (SMT) of 
biolinguistic minimalism (Chomsky 2000a et seq.), according to which human 
language is an optimal solution to the usability conditions imposed by the neigh-
boring performance systems (see also Narita 2009a, 2009b). They claim that the 
SMT is quite at odds with the above-mentioned facts of linguistic imperfection. 
They further claim that ‘evolvability’ should be a central constraint on linguistic 
theorizing, and that an evolutionarily plausible theory of human language 
should provide much more room for imperfect constituents than does the mini-
malist endeavor to seek optimality and perfection in the linguistic system.  
 K&M further argue that because minimalist notions like optimality and 
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perfection are never clarified in the minimalist literature, they cannot put any 
meaningful and realistic constraint on linguistic theorizing. Building on Pinker & 
Jackendoff’s (2005: 27) remark that “nothing is ‘perfect’ or ‘optimal’ across the 
board but only with respect to some desideratum”, K&M go on to examine vari-
ous possible criteria of optimality, including ease of production, ease of compre-
hension, ease of acquisition, efficient brain storage, efficient communication, effi-
cient information encoding, and minimization of energetic costs. None of these 
criteria strike them as plausible or promising, and so they draw the conclusion 
that, “unless there is some clear, a priori criterion for optimality, claims of opti-
mality have little force” (K&M: 198). 
 It is curious to note that, despite their forceful attempt to undermine the 
content of optimality and economy in the minimalist conception of human 
language, K&M fail to discuss (either involuntarily or deliberately) the source of 
optimality and efficiency that has been repeatedly (if not thoroughly) discussed 
in the minimalist literature: The third factor of language design (Chomsky 2005, 
2007a, 2007b, 2008). Chomsky (2005) reminds us of a virtual truism that the 
design of the faculty of language (FL), or of any biological system for that matter, 
should be attributed to three factors: (i) genetic endowment, (ii) external stimuli 
from the environment, and (iii) physical principles that are not specific to FL. 
Chomsky repeatedly emphasizes that among the third factor constituents is the 
principle of computational efficiency, which is expected to be of particular signi-
ficance for discrete generative systems such as human language.1 K&M examine 
many candidates for the measure of economy (asking, “optimality for what?”), 
but strangely, they completely fail to discuss the third factor, a central concept of 
the minimalist program that is claimed to be the criterion of computational opti-
mization of human language. 
 The nature of the third factor that enters into the SMT, let alone what 
kind(s) of energy or cost it is optimizing human linguistic computation for, is ad-
mittedly quite ill-understood at this early stage of minimalist inquiry, but there 
are already some promising proposals. For example, it is likely that the principle 
of economy of derivation (Chomsky 1995b: 138–145) will come to play a significant 
role in the undertaking of the SMT. It requires that syntax choose the least costly 
derivation to reach the interfaces, where the cost of derivation is determined 
solely by some syntax-internal metric, such as the number of derivational steps. 
This principle can be arguably regarded as a linguistic analogue of Hamilton’s 
Principle of Least Action; see Fukui (1996) for much relevant discussion. It is 
moreover conceivable that such an inherently global principle of computational 
optimization further forces syntactic derivation to adopt some sort of com-
putational cycles, such as phases (Uriagereka 1999, Chomsky 2000a, 2007, 2008), 
constituting a kind of heuristic ‘computational trick’ (Chomsky 1995b: 162, Fukui 
1996) that syntax uses for restricting computational domains locally and thus re-
ducing the computational load. Importantly, such a move toward optimization of 
                                                 
    1 In addition to the principle of computational efficiency, Chomsky also adds the constraints 
that enter into all facets of development and evolution of any organisms to the (forth-
coming) catalog of the third factor principles. Such principles are now explored intensively 
in the so-called “evo-devo revolution” (Chomsky 2007a: 3). 
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syntactic derivation is also corroborated by certain empirical considerations, as 
discussed in Chomsky (2000a et seq.) and Uriagereka (2009). Note further Uria-
gereka’s (2009) claim that the Chomsky Hierarchy of strong generative capacity 
figures in any computational system so naturally that it “can be understood as a 
primitive for the purposes of the SMT” (p. xvii). Uriagereka also makes the claim, 
following Hinzen & Uriagereka (2006), that syntax (as well as semantics) has 
formal structural bases akin to number theory and topology, hinting at the possi-
bility of comparative study of these human-unique capacities. Quite relevant to 
this future comparative research is Kuroda’s (2009) discovery that there exists a 
formal procedure for transforming the Euler product representations of certain ζ-
functions (a fundamental concept in number theory) into phrase-structure repre-
sentations, an intriguing result that should be readily translated into the Merge-
based generative system, as pointed out by Fukui (forthcoming); see also Fukui 
(1996, 2008), Uriagereka (1998, 2002, 2009), and Narita (2009a, 2009b, 2010a) for 
related discussion.  
 Needless to say, none of these proposals receive wide acceptance in the lite-
rature. They are rather under serious empirical scrutiny, and controversy arises 
as to how (or whether) these hypotheses can be refined or modified to accommo-
date apparent counterexamples. But this is the nature of any scientific inquiry, 
and we can only hope that we can eventually revise or refine the proper formu-
lation of the relevant computational principles through empirical examinations 
not only in linguistics proper but also language-external domains.  
 Contrary to such a normal research attitude toward the eventual refine-
ment of theoretical constructs, however, K&M claim that biolinguistic inquiry 
must meet a stringent requirement: That it attains some a priori content of the 
linguistic criteria of optimality before it can investigate the effect of such opti-
mization. Such a peculiar constraint upon possible lines of empirical inquiry is 
unheard of elsewhere in natural sciences. Rather, as is familiar with any other 
natural science, “we have to learn about the conditions that set the problem in the 
course of trying to solve it” (Chomsky 2008: 135–136). In such a naturalistic in-
quiry, the research task is bound to be interactive, in that it must seek to “clarify 
the nature of the interfaces and optimal computational principles [i.e. third factor 
principles — HN & KF] through investigation of how language satisfies the con-
ditions they impose” (p. 136). Inquiry into these problems is, further, naturally 
and ordinarily benefitted by posing the SMT as a working hypothesis: The 
research decision to investigate the effect of third factor principles in the domain 
of FL entails the expectation that there are indeed some such third factor prin-
ciples which are operative in the architecture and working of FL, and which we 
can hope to discover eventually.  
 K&M repeatedly accuse biolinguistic minimalism of the “presumption of 
perfection in language” (p. 187, 197, 201, 207). However, now we can conclude 
that their condemnation is primarily based on their misunderstanding of the 
SMT. As we have recapitulated above, the third factor and its efficient optimi-
zation in the domain of FL is something that minimalism is searching for, not 
something that it presumes. The SMT is not aprioristic presumption of perfection, 
but a working hypothesis that is adopted to (hopefully) enhance the eventual dis-
covery of some real substance in these notions. Optimality is just a nickname for 
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what we want to discover, not what we aprioristically insist on by vacuous spec-
ulation.2 It is trivially true that we have not come up with a proper and complete 
characterization of the relevant optimization principles, but that does not consti-
tute any reason for us not to hope for one.  
 
 
3. Evolvability, Adaptationism, and Minimalism 
 
Let us stress at this point that our position is in perfect agreement with K&M’s in 
several important respects. First and foremost, we firmly believe that our theory 
of language, if it is to be a biolinguistic one, must be compatible with what is 
known about biological evolution, of which language evolution represents a 
recent example. In fact, we have independently discussed and emphasized the 
importance of this kind of evolutionary plausibility constraint on linguistic 
theorizing under the rubrics of ‘evolutionary adequacy‘ (Fujita 2007, 2009) and 
’biological adequacy‘ (Narita 2010a), which we take to be conceptually equivalent 
to K&M’s evolvability condition understood in the most general sense; see also 
Boeckx & Uriagereka’s (2007) discussion of ’natural adequacy’.3 We also agree 
with K&M (and with every evolutionary biologist) that gradual adaptation by 
natural selection is a major element of biological evolution and that for familiar 
reasons it often yields only sub-optimal solutions, absolute optimality or per-
fection being rare cases. 
 That being said, we can point out several flaws in K&M’s arguments 
against minimalism. To begin with, as K&M themselves admit, “evolution some-
times achieves perfection or near-optimality” (p. 188). So it is rather self-
contradictory that they reject from the start the possibility that language is one in-
stance of such perfection. By doing so, they are actually claiming that language is 
very special in the biological world, contrary to their own belief that it is not. In 
fact, many instances of biological design can be shown to obey some optimization 
principles. A classic case is bone structure, which achieves maximal strength with 
minimal material (Roux’s maximum-minimum law; see Gierse 1976). Likewise, 
blood vessels are known to have an architecture that ensures efficient blood flow 
with minimum energy consumption. Also, Christopher Cherniak’s work on brain 
wiring minimization, often cited in Chomsky’s recent writings (Chomsky 2005 et 
seq.), points to the fascinating conclusion that neural optimization is a ubiquitous 
biological property derived “for free, directly from physics” (Cherniak 2005, 
2009, Cherniak et al. 2004). In fact, there is a long history of debate among biolo-
                                                 
    2 However, see section 4 for our own assessment of the current minimalist literature.  
    3 More technically, evolvability can be defined as “the organism’s capacity to facilitate the 
generation of nonlethal selectable phenotypic variation from random mutation” (Gerhart & 
Kirschner 2003: 133) or “how probable […] it is that a species, or life form in general, will 
evolve into something new” (Ridley 2004: 587). It is therefore somewhat misleading to claim 
that language is evolvable in order to express the truism that language is a product of bio-
logical evolution. Precursors of language, or our ancestors who had them, were evolvable, 
but whether language itself is evolvable (according to the strict definition given above) even 
today is another matter. See also Masel & Trotter (2010) for an in-depth examination of the 
notion of evolvability.  
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gists with respect to the extent to which biological design can be said to be opti-
mized for relevant functions. The theory of ‘symmorphosis’, for example, claims 
that a biological structure is economically designed, to an extent that is just 
sufficient to satisfy its functional need (Weibel 1998, Weibel et al. 1991). Given 
this state of affairs, we need to realize that at least conceptually, the evolvability 
condition on language does not preclude the possibility that (part of) the human 
language faculty also instantiates such optimal design found elsewhere in the 
biological world.  
 It is interesting to note in this context that already in the famous Chomsky–
Piaget debate in 1975 (see Piattelli-Palmarini 1980), Piaget criticized the highly 
complex (‘imperfect’) model of transformational generative grammar which was 
then under development as “biologically inexplicable” (Piaget 1980: 31; we may 
justifiably rephrase it as ‘un-evolvable’). In his reply to Piaget, Chomsky (1980) 
had no problem in admitting that the evolution of human language is “biologi-
cally unexplained”, but he added that this situation is generally true for any 
other biological organisms, and that, correspondingly, any criticism of biological 
implausibility/’inevolvability’ cannot carry much empirical force in natural sci-
ence. The evolution of an organism is, like anything else in the biological world, a 
result of complex interplay among the three factors of design mentioned in the 
last section, and without sufficient understanding of their delineation, jumbling 
such massive interaction effects under the broad name of evolution or evolvabili-
ty cannot be really helpful or informative. Nor, in the absence of a precise under-
standing, can it reasonably be defended as a constraint on any biological theori-
zing, be it the highly complicated model of transformational grammar in the late 
1970’s or the currently developing minimalist inquiry.  
 K&M observe, ostensibly correctly, that perfection and optimality do not 
very often result from adaptation by natural selection, but then they hastily 
conclude, incorrectly, that evolvability considerations do not tolerate the 
optimality of language design that minimalism is searching for. While surely 
adaptation by natural selection is one major aspect of evolution, it must also be 
admitted that natural selection does not work in a vacuum, and a full 
understanding of biological evolution requires taking into account many factors 
other than natural selection, including random genetic drift, genetic assimilation, 
exaptation, self-organization, canalization, etc., all of which are presumably 
governed by the physical laws of nature. In other words, a theory of natural 
selection needs to be supplemented by those mechanisms if it is to explain 
anything about evolution.  
 As we saw in the previous section, minimalism is essentially a research 
program that seeks to identify the (optimizing) effect of physical laws of nature 
in the domain of human language. K&M’s rejection of the minimalist endeavor, 
then, essentially amounts to making a very unrealistic claim that we had better 
disregard the relevance of all such effects (viz. the third factor) from biolinguistic 
theorizing, prioritizing the notion of gradual adaptation. We hold that this 
position is not tenable for language, or indeed in any evolutionary studies. It is 
quite possible that K&M themselves fail to appreciate their commitment to this 
unrealistic claim, but this is again due to their failure to recognize minimalism as 
a quest for the third factor.  
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 It can be pointed out that the above-mentioned unrealistic view can be seen 
as a particular instantiation of what Godfrey-Smith (2001) calls ‘empirical adapta-
tionism’, a very strong empirical hypothesis which holds that it is possible to pre-
dict and explain the outcome of evolutionary processes by attending only to the 
role played by natural selection (p. 336). According to this view, no other evolu-
tionary factor has the degree of causal importance that natural selection assumes, 
so that we can safely ignore all other non-selective factors, if any, and focus on 
adaptation by natural selection for the purpose of understanding evolution. 
Empirical adaptationism understood as such is easy to refute, for which we re-
gard the references cited above as providing ample evidence.  
 Incidentally, Godfrey-Smith points out that it is important to appreciate the 
difference between empirical adaptationism and at least two other kinds: expla-
natory adaptationism and methodological adaptationism. According to Godfrey-
Smith, ‘explanatory adaptationism’ is the position which holds that adaptedness 
of the design of organisms to environments is the most important problem to be 
addressed in evolutionary biology and that natural selection should be the 
primary solution to understanding it. According to this view, natural selection 
keeps its central role in evolutionary biology even if its effect eventually turns out 
to be scarce in the actual world. Thus, if some trait exhibits adaptedness to an 
environment, it is regarded by explanatory adaptationism as primarily a result of 
natural selection, but there is no implication here that all traits are adaptations, 
nor that natural selection always yields adaptive traits. In contrast, ‘methodolo-
agical adaptationism’ only makes the claim of heuristic interest that adaptation 
and good design fashioned through it are the first things biologists should seek 
in evolutionary studies. According to this third view, the idea of adaptation is a 
good “organizing concept” (p. 337), and the search for it offers the best methodo-
logical guideline for the study of evolutionary biology, by and large independent 
of the actual privilege natural selection assumes in evolution. Godfrey-Smith 
points out that most of the perplexing controversy concerning the (in)validity of 
the adaptationist program derives from failure to differentiate these three kinds 
of empirical adaptationism: Some argue in favor of one kind, while others try to 
refute them when in fact they are only arguing against another kind of 
adaptationism. Misunderstandings of this sort should be regarded as a harmful 
barrier to the development of evolutionary biology and in particular to the sound 
progress in biolinguistic studies of language evolution. See Godfrey-Smith (2001), 
and also Shanahan (2004), for relevant discussion. Needless to mention, our 
refusal of adaptationism does not in itself imply that we discount the potential of 
the adaptationist research program to bear fruit along the other two research 
guidelines.  
 If only for the sake of understanding the real force of K&M’s criticism, it 
might be advisable to entertain a parallel categorization of the oft-noted different 
interpretations of minimalism, which can be achieved basically by replacing 
‘adaptation’ and ‘natural selection’ in the above discussion with ‘optimality/ 
simplicity’ and ‘the third factor’, respectively.4 On one hand, science is guided by 
                                                 
    4 However, let us stress from the outset that we are not claiming that the three aspects of mini-
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a research methodology that seeks to eliminate redundancies in assumptions as 
much as possible, and thus calls for parsimony and simplicity in theory con-
structions — the usual ‘Occam’s razor’ considerations, indeed a general feature of 
any theoretical inquiry. In the case of biolinguistic inquiry, this generic research 
methodology substantiates itself in what is often referred to as ‘methodological 
minimalism’. It takes the notion ‘simplicity of language’ primarily as a good 
“organizing concept”, and regards the search for simplicity and optimality in this 
object of inquiry as offering the best research heuristics for biolinguistic inquiry, 
largely independent of claims about the actual relevance of the third factor to the 
design of FL. On the other hand, minimalism is also understood as a substantive 
empirical hypothesis about language design, that language is in fact optimally 
designed for elegance, thus taking the concept ‘simplicity/optimality of lang-
uage’ as having substantive empirical content. This position is what is often 
called ‘substantive minimalism’. We may further say that substantive mini-
malism in principle allows at least two different interpretations. Let us say that 
’empirical minimalism‘ is the empirical hypothesis which holds that it is possible 
to predict and explain the entirety of the architecture of FL by attending only to 
the role played by the third factor, and that we can safely ignore all other factors 
and focus on optimization by the third factor for the purpose of understanding 
the whole design of FL. ‘Explanatory minimalism’, by contrast, holds that opti-
mal design is the most theoretically interesting explanandum in biolinguistics and 
that the third factor should be the primary solution to understanding it. Thus, the 
third factor remains to be a central concept in explanatory minimalism even if its 
optimizing effect may eventually turn out to govern only a fraction of language 
design.  
 We must concede that empirical minimalism is plainly implausible — it 
seems indeed “too much to expect” (Chomsky 2004: 106) at the current stage of 
understanding. First of all, empirical minimalism in its strongest interpretation 
amounts to denial of any significant relevance of the first factor (genetic endow-
ment) and the second factor (external stimuli from the environment) to language 
design. This cannot be right, if only because language is a genetically grounded, 
species-specific trait, and its maturation in a particular individual requires at 
least three to four years of complex social interaction with the speech community.  
 Moreover, even if we grant a weaker interpretation of empirical mini-
malism as a claim of explanatory priority of the third factor and its optimizing 
effect, it is still a rather daunting hypothesis, prima facie easy to refute. Arguably, 
it is primarily to this refutation that K&M make a rather sound contribution by 
citing various signs of imperfection in language design. However, just as 
rejection of empirical adaptationism does not entail exclusion of the other two 
                                                                                                                                      
malism discussed below are mutually incompatible. Rather, they should be regarded as mu-
tually supporting dimensions of one and the same research program (see below). The ever-
lasting centrality of the notion of simplicity that figures in various aspects of the generative 
grammatical research since its earliest stage of development is explicitly acknowledged by 
Chomsky (1955). The earlier work by Nelson Goodman (and also W.V.O. Quine) on the 
general notion of simplicity is particularly influential in this respect (see Tomalin 2003 for 
related discussion). 
H. Narita & K. Fujita 
 
364 
kinds of adaptationist research, K&M’s refutation of empirical minimalism by no 
means justifies their conclusion that the whole minimalist enterprise is 
unwarranted. It is rather regrettable to observe that K&M seem to regard their 
criticism of minimalism as completed just by simply referring to a small set of ill-
understood drawbacks of language design. Even more puzzling is the obser-
vation that K&M’s relatively sound criticism of the current minimalist literature 
is invalidated by their unmindful (if not deliberate) adoption of empirical adap-
tationism. Incidentally, K&M’s misinterpretation of the minimalist enterprise is 
quite reminiscent of the oft-made mistake in philosophy of biology that Godfrey-
Smith identifies. That is, just as the adaptationist research program in its entirety 
should not be frowned upon solely by attending to apparent counterevidence to 
empirical adaptationism, methodological and explanatory minimalism cannot be 
disproved simply by citing examples of apparent imperfections in language 
design. 
 Let us emphasize, along with Godfrey-Smith, that the three forms of adap-
tationism and minimalism are not so much mutually exclusive partitions as mu-
tually supporting dimensions of the shared research program (see footnote 4). In 
this context, it can be somewhat puzzling to admit that one can make a legitimate 
decision to put forward claims of empirical adaptationism or empirical minima-
lism as effective research heuristics, thus utilizing the very empirical thesis for meth-
odology’s sake. Indeed, this is the reading that Godfrey-Smith proposes to grant 
to, for example, the strong adaptationist take by Richard Dawkins. Minimalism’s 
advancement of the SMT can and should be understood in a similar vein, too. 
Thus, it often happens that postulations of unwarranted redundancies or questi-
onable stipulations in the model of FL are refuted as not deducible from the SMT 
— a very weak argument in itself, if only because we have only a partial under-
standing of the third factor at present, but nevertheless of some heuristic value. If 
anything, K&M’s misunderstanding of minimalism as presumption of optimality 
in language may be partially rooted in their failure to appreciate the legitimacy of 
such options. Of course, K&M and others can question the fruitfulness of this sort 
of approach, again perfectly legitimately. 
 By acknowledging the current weakness of empirical adaptationism and 
empirical minimalism, we are only restating the virtual truism that the factors en-
tering into biological evolution cannot be exhausted either by natural selection or 
physical constraints. Pluralism, instead of the belief in the omnipotence of natural 
selection, is the norm in evolutionary biology today. Reference to evolvability is 
justified in every respect in a biological study of language, but K&M miss the 
point that evolvability cannot be defined solely in terms of adaptation by natural 
selection. Obviously, natural selection only serves as a filtering condition on pre-
existing variations, and the primary question is how these variations first came 
into existence. In other words, arrival of the fittest, instead of survival of the 
fittest, is the core issue in any evolutionary study. It is in this context that the pri-
macy of physical constraints on possible forms is emphasized in modern biology 
as well as in biolinguistic minimalism (the third factor). Thus, Chomsky (2004: 
105) stresses that “natural selection can only function within a ‘channel’ of opti-
ons afforded by natural law”, which is essentially a restatement of Stephen Jay 
Gould’s remark on the importance of physical channels. Chomsky (2002: 140–
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141) also suggests the possibility that “the whole of evolution is shaped by physi-
cal processes in a deep sense, yielding many properties that are casually attribu-
ted to selection”. More recently, Fitch (2010) points to the tight connection bet-
ween selection and constraints (developmental and otherwise) in his discussion 
on evolvability; “the mutually informative roles of selection and constraints are 
now accepted by most biologists as important aspects of biological and evoluti-
onary explanation” (p. 63). The central role played by natural laws in evolution is 
discussed in detail also by Fodor & Piattelli-Palmarini (2010), who argue intens-
ively that natural selection does not have strong explanatory force in naturalistic 
studies of evolution, and if their observations have attracted harsh criticism from 
biologists (see, for example, Futuyma 2010), that is so because they sound as if 
they are just attacking a straw man of empirical adaptationism, which cannot 
reasonably be called “What Darwin Got Wrong” because Darwin never believed 
it in the first place. He concluded his Introduction to The Origin of Species by ex-
plicitly writing that he was “convinced that Natural Selection has been the main 
but not exclusive means of modification”. 
 Needless to say, whether or not the other versions of adaptationism 
(methodological and explanatory) are promising is a totally different matter, and 
without doubt many biologists remain strongly committed to them, still attend-
ing to natural selection as a primary explanatory concept. It seems justifiable to 
say that biolinguistic minimalism departs from this tradition, in the sense that it 
puts forward the SMT both as a heuristic working hypothesis and as an empirical 
conjecture, primarily focusing on advancing the discovery and demonstration of 
the third factor principles and the sense in which they optimize the design of FL 
(and of biological organisms in general). The choice between methodological/ex-
planatory adaptationism and methodological/explanatory minimalism cannot be 
made a priori, and we hope that both positions have their own contributions to 
make for the future progress of biolinguistics; perhaps a successful reconciliation 
or unification of the two approaches will be a key factor for our comprehensive 
understanding of human language, and we are more enthusiastic than anyone 
else to learn about an adaptationist account, if any, of the origin and evolution of 
the computational system of language, whose internal mechanism is most un-
likely to fit in with the notion of adaptive fitness.  
 Recall also that the new framework of evo-devo is characterized, in part, by 
its shift of focus from adaptation to constraints on developmental processes in 
explaining evolution (and also by its departure from genetic determinism). The 
reemerging strong interest in morphology and laws of form, which dates back to 
the days of Goethe, is changing our view of how new biological species and traits 
emerge. Perhaps a simplistic dichotomy of adaptation vs. constraints is inappro-
priate, and a pluralistic approach to evolution is called for more than ever today. 
This standpoint of New or Expanded Synthesis is fully compatible with the mini-
malist view on language design and language evolution that proposes to take the 
third factor into fuller consideration.5 
                                                 
    5 Let us add in this connection that K&M’s sympathy with an optimality-theoretic account of 
parametric variation among languages stands in direct opposition to their own standard of 
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 Before closing this section, we would like to note that the notion of evolva-
bility is to be regarded with more or less the same status as that of optimality 
(recall the discussion in section 2) since at present, we have little understanding 
of laws and principles that constrain the class of possible evolutionary (and 
developmental) processes, of which attested specimens might be only a tiny 
accidental fraction. If we are hoping for a better understanding of biological and 
language evolution, we have to “learn about the conditions that set the problem 
in the course of trying to solve it”; that is, we have to seek insights into the con-
ditions on evolution and development, imposed by natural law (i.e. the third 
factor), in our theoretical inquiry into the nature of any biological mechanism, in-
cluding human language. To this end, we need to reject any aprioristic adherence 
to a particular framing of the relevant issues, empirical adaptationism being a 
typical example.  
 In this section, we have pointed out that current understanding of evolu-
tionary processes in the biological world requires all sorts of theoretical explan-
ations as well as speculations that are by no means exhausted by adaptation by 
natural selection, and hence that the notion of evolvability, if defined solely in 
terms of adaptation, cannot serve as a legitimate constraint on linguistic theori-
zing. Instead, it has to be framed from a pluralistic viewpoint, in conformity with 
the emerging new picture of biological evolution. Correspondingly, K&M’s re-
jection of minimalist inquiry into the relevance of the third factor to language 
design, which amounts to empirical adaptationism, cannot be tolerated as a ratio-
nal and naturalistic approach to the evolution of human language. We conclude 
that although K&M’s call for an evolvability constraint on linguistic theory is 
sound and fair in itself, it is exactly because of this constraint, properly under-
stood in light of modern evolutionary thinking, that minimalism stands as a pro-
mising research agenda.  
 
 
4. Emancipating Biolinguistics from Methodological Dualism 
 
We saw in the previous sections that K&M’s criticism of the minimalist endeavor 
was largely based on (i) their misunderstanding of the minimalist program as 
aprioristic presumption of perfection, and (ii) their unbalanced formulation of the 
constraint of evolvability. We regard it as rather unfortunate that these serious 
flaws render their objection to the recent minimalist work almost invalid. In this 
section, however, we would like to express our sincere regard for K&M’s other-
wise sound and reasonable criticism of recent work in the purported minimalist 
framework.  
                                                                                                                                      
evolvability. They favor OT because it “captures the facts as a result of relaxing the demands 
of perfection and economy” (p. 206). According to OT, knowledge of language is seen as a 
set of competing constraints, with different rankings among them giving rise to different 
types of grammar. This kind of theorizing fares well if one’s sole concern lies in a neat 
description of language variation. The problem is, of course, that those OT constraints, and 
their rankings, because of their highly language-specific composition, are not something one 
can expect to find a biological and evolutionary explanation for, particularly if one is com-
mitted to the kind of adaptationist program K&M tacitly recommend. 
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 We noted that the minimalist program seeks signs of optimality in human 
language only as an intermediate step toward the attribution of them to third 
factor principles that are yet to be discovered.6 However, it is admittedly the case 
that most practitioners of minimalism rarely present serious discussion on the 
third factor of language design. In fact, the scarceness of pertinent discussion in 
the minimalist literature may partially justify K&M’s failure to notice the impor-
tance of this fundamental concept. It is a regrettable fact that minimalism is often 
misconstrued, sometimes even by those researchers who count themselves as 
practitioners of this research program, as a dogmatic or authoritarian excuse to 
disrespect empirical problems and take advantage of vaguely and arbitrarily 
invoked notions of simplicity and optimality in favor of their favorite descriptive 
technologies.  
 The worrisome descriptive tools put forward in self-described minimalist 
work include, to mention a few, the proliferating cartography of functional cate-
gories,7 an intractable number of parameters (micro or macro) distributed over 
different modules of FL,8 countless uninterpretable features (‘viruses’) that are 
stipulated to selectively attract neighboring X0s and XPs,9 and massive stipu-
lations of head- and phrasal (remnant) movement to accommodate, for example, 
the universal linear order template (Specifier–Head–Complement) of Kayne’s 
(1994) LCA.10 We regard these descriptive technologies as a residue of the earlier 
pre-minimalist practice of enriching UG from descriptive pressures. To the extent 
that they are claimed (admittedly on questionable premises and with auxiliary 
assumptions) to achieve some descriptive adequacy, we should regard them not 
as a final explanation but as a first descriptive approximation of the data to be 
explained in terms of the three factors in the language design (Chomsky 2005). 
Whether we really need to live with these prima facie imperfections is purely an 
empirical question, but little discussion is provided regarding how these con-
structs relate to the third factor or, if not, how they are ever acquirable from the 
impoverished primary linguistic data. Discussion of learnability and/or bio-
logical plausibility is really a must for the advocates of these technical concepts, 
and the apparent scarceness of any such justification must have made K&M and 
others queasy. ‘Conceptual’ arguments from arbitrarily defined notions of opti-
mality are occasionally provided for these constructs in the literature, but most of 
them are largely irrelevant to, and, even worse, rather noticeably contradict, the 
real concern of evolutionary/biological adequacy.  
                                                 
    6 This is not to deny the possibility that adaptation by natural selection can be one of the 
decisive optimizing factors for some particular aspects of the biological world. 
    7 See Cinque (1999, 2002), Rizzi (2004), Cinque & Rizzi (2010), and references cited therein. See 
Narita (2010a) for criticism.  
    8 See Newmeyer (2005, 2006, 2008) for serious criticism. See also an inconclusive reply to 
Newmeyer by Roberts & Holmberg (2005).  
    9 See Boeckx (2010, to appear) and Narita (2010a) for criticism of the unconstrained use of 
features.  
    10 See Kayne (1994, 2004, 2009). See Fukui & Takano (1998), Chomsky (2004), Richard (2004), 
Narita (2010a, 2010b), and references cited therein for criticism of the LCA. Incidentally, 
Kayne is right in admitting, in response to Chomsky’s (2004) charge that the LCA is an ‘im-
perfection’: “It might alternatively be the case that our initial intuitions about perfection vs. 
imperfection (in this technical sense) are not fully reliable” (Kayne 2004: 4–5). 
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 In a nutshell, stipulating arbitrarily formulated conceptions of ‘optimality’, 
let alone presuming them, is very much at odds with the minimalist quest for an 
evolutionarily or biologically adequate theory of FL (see Fujita 2007 and Narita 
2010a). We completely agree with K&M on this point. More generally, we take 
the essence of K&M’s suggestion to be that we should not be trapped by any 
prejudices or arbitrary anecdotes regarding the nature of the object of inquiry, a 
sound warning that supports K&M’s criticism of the actual practice of purported 
minimalists, while it simultaneously invalidates K&M’s own adherence to anti-
minimalist imperfectionism. 
 This discussion leads us to a natural conclusion: We had better not commit 
ourselves to what Chomsky (1995a, 2000b) calls methodological dualism, a view 
that “we must abandon scientific rationality when we study humans ‘above the 
neck’ (metaphorically speaking), becoming mystics in this unique domain, impo-
sing arbitrary stipulations and a priori demands of a sort that would never be con-
templated in the sciences” (Chomsky 2000b: 76). So-called semantic externalism 
(Putnam 1975, Dummett 1986, among many others) was originally subsumed un-
der this methodological category, but it rather straightforwardly applies to such 
research doctrines that are entangled in mystic presumption or terminological 
manipulation of vague and arbitrary notions of optimality or evolvability (see 
Kuroda 1999, 2009, Hinzen 2006, and Narita 2009b for related discussion). This 
insidious doctrine is counterposed to methodological naturalism, a naturalistic 
approach to the mind that “investigates mental aspects of the world as we do any 
others, seeking to construct intelligible explanatory theories, with the hope of 
eventual integration with the ‘core’ natural sciences” (Chomsky 2000b: 76). Speci-
fically, at the current stage of understanding, where little is known about the 
three factors of language design and their interactions, we should proceed to 
study human language as it is, without any preconception about what we can ev-
entually learn from this domain of inquiry. This naturalistic inquiry may be 
benefited by adopting the SMT as a conjecture or as a heuristic working hypo-
thesis, but only to the extent that it is reasonable.  
 Contrast this overall picture of naturalistic inquiry with the dualistic 
speculation that apparently underlies K&M’s discussion. The speculation is to the 
effect that biology is different from physics, with language exclusively belonging 
to the domain of the former. Marcus (2008: 115), in expressing his discontent with 
minimalism, explicitly states: “[W]hat works for physics may well not work for 
linguistics. Linguistics, after all, is a property of biology — the biology of the 
human brain — and as the late Francis Crick once put it, ‘[i]n physics, they have 
laws; in biology, we have gadgets’”. He continues that “evolution is often more 
about alighting on something that happens to work than what might in principle 
work best or most elegantly; it would be surprising if language, among evo-
lution’s most recent innovations, was any different”.11 The kind of alighting effect 
                                                 
    11 And because language is such a recent innovation, K&M argue, there must have been little 
time for “debugging” (p. 190). We take this to mean nothing more than that natural selection 
did not have enough time to modify the design specification of language. The two sides 
agree that optimality of language design cannot be explained by natural selection. From this, 
K&M reason that language cannot be optimal; our alternative reasoning is that natural 
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mentioned here has been known as tinkering or bricolage (à la François Jacob) 
and it is an important facet of biological evolution, but still it has to be empha-
sized that tinkering is still constrained by the laws of physics. To say that biology 
and physics are categorically distinct and unrelated, that there is nothing in bio-
logy (and linguistics) that can be understood in terms of natural laws, is plainly a 
dualistic attitude which hinders the progress of a highly interdisciplinary project 
like biolinguistics. In fact, as Dawkins (1988: 15) once put it: 
 
The biologist tries to explain the workings, and the coming into existence, of 
complex things, in terms of simpler things. He can regard his task as done 
when he has arrived at entities so simple that they can safely be handed over 
to physicists. 
 
Thus the division of labor between biology and physics must be pursued with 
the eventual goal that biological issues will someday turn into physical issues 
(though probably not by simple reduction), rather than adopting the ungrounded 
belief that biology will never come into contact with physics; the development of 
biophysics in the domain of morphogenesis is a clear exemplar of the still-
developing progress of scientific unification of precisely the type for which we 
advocate. Biolinguistic minimalism can be seen as nothing more than a linguistic 
version of modern biology which is making every endeavor to disentangle the 
surface complexities of the biological organ which we call language, so that those 
complexities may eventually be explained by simple primitives and universal 
laws of nature. 
 
 
5. Remarks on the Metaphysics of Minimalist Biolinguistics  
 
Before concluding the discussion, we would like to remark that methodological 
naturalism, if couched in minimalist terms, is closely connected to naturalism of a 
metaphysical sort, too, which is quite reminiscent of the fact that methodological 
dualism was historically contingent on the corresponding metaphysical mind–
body dualism of the Cartesian sort.  
 At the time of Descartes, at least, there was a naturalistic definition of the 
physical, which was based on ‘mechanical philosophy’, a metaphysical doctrine 
dominant in the 17th century. The physical (body, matter, etc.), as conceived of in 
mechanical philosophy, was defined as any material substance with three-
dimensional spatial extension; such material, and only such material, could move 
and participate in Descartes’ contact mechanics. In pushing this hypothesis, 
Descartes categorically rejected the relevance to physics of any mystical forces or 
powers, “occult qualities” of sympathy, antipathy, and so on, presumed in the 
then-dominant Scholastic and Aristotelian view of the world, and put forward a 
very strong empirical hypothesis that all phenomena of motion are to be ex-
plained strictly in terms of immediate contact of contiguous materials. The Carte-
                                                                                                                                      
selection alone is therefore unable to explain language evolution or, for that matter, biolo-
gical evolution in general.  
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sian mechanical philosophy was quite congenial to our common-sense under-
standing of the world (folk physics), so intuitively appealing and intelligible to 
our common-sense understanding of the world that we often forget that this 
mechanical conception of the physical was effectively demolished by one of 
Newton’s discoveries in the late 17th century. Specifically, Newton’s notion of 
gravity affects objects at a distance, without any medium of body. Thus, his pro-
posal was regarded by the leading scientists of the day as a reintroduction of an 
“immaterial”, “occult” cause that Cartesian contact mechanics had eliminated 
long before. The mechanical philosophical conception of the material world, 
where causality among the physical is confined to immediate contact of the phy-
sical as a matter of principle, thus turned out to be a wrong scientific hypothesis.  
 When metaphysical mind–body dualism declined, we were explicitly told 
by Newton’s discovery that we have no valid, metaphysically closed framework 
of the physical that partitions off the domain of application of physical laws as a 
matter of principle. This conclusion troubled Newton and his contemporaries a 
lot, and he was often accused of reintroducing an immaterial occult force to the 
domain of physics. But, at least for the purpose of pursuing cognitive sciences, 
we can regard this Newtonian conclusion as advantageous: Thanks to Newton, 
there is no longer a well-defined boundary for the coherent physical domain in 
the post-Newtonian era, and correspondingly, there is no longer any principled 
reason to exclude the possibility that the set of laws of physics, chemistry, mathe-
matics, and other natural sciences are also applicable to the domain of the mind 
as well. We can only conjecture, as Descartes did, that the creative aspect of lang-
uage use (Chomsky 2000, 2009a; see also McGilvray 2009a, 2009b, and Narita 
2009b) still somehow resists explanation in terms of these natural laws, but the 
possibility becomes an open empirical question for mental computational mecha-
nisms discovered by contemporary biolinguists and carefully delineated from the 
boundless creativity of language use. There are indeed quite a few general laws 
of nature that have been discovered and independently justified by physicists, 
mathematicians, and other scientists as empirically necessary in their domains of 
inquiry. Some of these empirically necessary postulates might eventually turn 
out, probably with the help of further abstraction and refinement, to be operative 
in the design of FL, too, in which case such principles will enter into the category 
of the third factor of language design. Indeed, the null hypothesis is that the 
general laws of nature are also applicable to the mental aspects of the world. The 
inapplicability of them to a certain domain, say of language, would be a non-
trivial empirical finding that calls for explanation.  
 Taking this null hypothesis seriously, investigation into the third factor of 
language design regards even mental phenomena like language as sources of 
data that might turn out to be susceptible to accounts in terms of general laws of 
nature. Along these lines, we would like to point out that minimalist inquiry can 
be seen as proposing a somewhat unconventional variety of ‘metaphysical natu-
ralism’. Metaphysical naturalism, whose essence basically amounts to denial or 
non-employment of metaphysical dualism, is almost always equated with the 
reductionist thesis called ‘physicalism’ or ‘materialism’ in the philosophical tra-
dition, which holds that only the physical (or the observable) is real and that the 
mental can and should be reduced to entities of those categories (see, e.g., Chom-
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sky 2000b: 79ff. and 143ff. for discussion of varieties of alleged naturalism and 
materialism). However, the equation is only illusory. The upshot of the above-
mentioned Newtonian conclusion is that we no longer have any scientifically 
coherent definition of the ‘physical’ to which we can reasonably entertain any 
meticulous reduction. Thus, unless some alternative characterization of the phy-
sical (body, matter, etc.) is provided, any statement of the form “everything there 
exists in the world is physical” diminishes to an uninteresting proverb of little 
empirical import (see Stoljar 2000, 2001, 2006, Chomsky 2009b, and Narita 2009b 
for related discussion). Rather, the notion of physicality, just like optimality and 
evolvability, is not something that can constrain, let alone serve as the ‘reduction 
base’ for, the study of the mental. It is instead something that we must study 
through investigation into various aspects of the world, mental and otherwise. 
Time will tell how feasible such research is, but there is no reason to discredit the 
fact that human language constitutes an interesting specimen of the natural 
world that happens to admit scientific exploration to some extent, and the hope is 
that we can eventually find laws and principles that are operative in the design of 
FL as well as the other aspects of the world. Furthermore, to the extent that we 
can make any empirical progress in this line of approach, we are heading toward 
the eventual unification with other natural sciences that biolinguistics, as well as 
earlier Cartesian studies of the mind, have long been looking for, an overarching 
desideratum that amplifies the contemporary significance of minimalism, especi-
ally of the ‘explanatory’ dimension mentioned above.  
 This kind of research is methodologically naturalist in that it does not 
admit any stipulated differentiation of the methods of inquiry. Moreover, it is 
metaphysically naturalist in that it does not allow itself to be entangled in any 
stipulated preconceptions or partitions of the world (“evolution yields imper-
fection”, “language is (im)perfect”, “the mental is reduced to the physical”, etc.), 
and it searches for overarching laws and principles whose effects crosscut both 
physical and mental aspects of the world. No success is guaranteed, but this is 
again a familiar feature of naturalistic inquiry.12 
 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
As we saw in the previous sections, K&M’s insistence that evolvability should be 
a central constraint on linguistic theorizing, though sound in principle, cannot 
carry much force unless it reflects the full range of complex factors that drive bio-
logical evolution, many of which remain rather unclear at the current stage of un-
derstanding. We pointed out that K&M’s conception of evolvability is specifically 
prejudiced toward Neo-Darwinian adaptationism and fatally flawed by what we 
have called the fallacy of empirical adaptationism, and that imposing such a pre-
sumptuous framework on biolinguistics might not foster empirical discoveries in 
                                                 
    12 See also Chomsky (2007a) and Narita (2009a, 2009b) for related discussion on Hinzen (2006) 
and Uriagereka’s (2009) approach to the issue of ‘naturalization of meaning’. See also Mc-
Gilvray (2009b). 
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the domain of inquiry. We noted that it is quite unfortunate that K&M’s other-
wise reasonable and partially justifiable objection to the body of current minima-
list literature is marred by (i) their misunderstanding of the SMT as an aprioristic 
presumption of optimality and (ii) their adherence to anti-minimalist imper-
fectionism based on their biased view of evolution. Notwithstanding these flaws, 
we remain obliged to K&M in that their criticism has illustrates exactly why prac-
titioners of the minimalist enterprise should stop inventing stipulative techno-
logies without scrutinizing their biological plausibility, and that we must also be 
careful not to make use of undefined notions of optimality as unwarranted justi-
fications for arbitrary conclusions. This amounts to just another recommendation 
of methodological naturalism (Chomsky 1995a, 2000b), which we may hope to 
invest with some metaphysical import, too, as future biolinguistic inquiry under 
the guidance of the SMT might reveal. 
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